Iran Announced the Two-Chokepoint Trap. The US Built Into It.

On June 9, IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani said something in public that should have changed every calculation about Gulf energy security.

From the Strait of Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, a new security belt of the Resistance will be established. — Esmail Qaani

Six weeks later, on July 20, the Houthis blockaded the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and attacked two Saudi oil tankers with drones and missiles, setting the Encelia ablaze 80 nautical miles off Al Shuqaiq ^[1]. Brent crude surged past $100 a barrel ^[1]. The Dow fell 581 points, the Nasdaq 681 ^[2]. The "security belt" Qaani described was not a threat. It was an itinerary. And the US-led bypass strategy — the multibillion-dollar pipeline buildout designed to make Gulf oil "strait-proof" — routed crude directly into the corridor Iran had already marked for closure. The pipeline story itself acknowledged the risk. Even as planners mapped routes to Saudi Arabia's Yanbu port on the Red Sea, targeting 9 million barrels per day of capacity, the reporting noted that "Iran has threatened to use Houthi proxies in Yemen to block the Bab el-Mandeb Strait" ^[3]. Goldman Sachs estimated 60% of Gulf oil could be strait-proof by 2028 ^[3]. The Houthis blockaded the strait in July 2026, two years ahead of schedule. The timing supports the reading of a calibrated response, not a coincidence. The US blockade against Iran was suspended for roughly a month, during which Iran exported 70 million barrels, then reinstated on July 19 ^[4]. The Houthis declared their blockade on July 20. Trump himself confirmed the proxy relationship ^[5].

the U.S. will hold Iran responsible, in that the Houthis are a Surrogate and/or Proxy of Iran, and major military punishment will be inflicted upon Iran, and of course, the Houthis, themselves — Donald Trump

The architecture of the trap is now fully visible. Iran closed Hormuz; the bypass rerouted oil to the Red Sea; Iran's proxy closed the Red Sea. The two chokepoints form a pincer, and the bypass strategy — far from escaping it — completed it. The second crisis hits a system already drained. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve has fallen to its lowest level since 1983, roughly 15% of capacity, after the IEA coordinated a record 400-million-barrel release to absorb the Hormuz shock ^[6]. US strikes on Iran had already pushed crude toward $83 a barrel ^[7]. The buffer that contained the first chokepoint crisis is nearly spent, so the Bab el-Mandeb blockade produces steeper market plunges than Hormuz alone — oil above $100, stock markets tumbling, and Goldman Sachs forecasting prices between $100 and $120 through 2026 ^[8]. The response to the new chokepoint is the same punishment-track approach that never reopened the old one. The US launched a missile strike on Larak Island, targeting an Iranian maritime traffic control tower ^[9]. Seven ships were redirected to enforce a naval blockade against Iran — preventing vessels from entering or leaving Iranian ports — not to escort shipping through the Red Sea or clear the Bab el-Mandeb ^[4]. Trump threatened the Houthis with major military punishment ^[2]. The international coalition condemned the blockade ^[10]. But no one is clearing the lane. The asymmetry this creates is stark. On July 23, two Chinese state-owned tankers — the Xin Long Yang and the Cosnew Lake — successfully transited the Bab el-Mandeb carrying Saudi crude from Yanbu, while Saudi tankers burned ^[1]. The Houthi blockade is selectively enforced: Chinese vessels receive safe passage, Western and Saudi shipping does not. China's foreign ministry, from the neutral-mediator position its safe-passage privilege affords, urged restraint and dialogue ^[11]. Sultan Al Jaber, the head of ADNOC, identified the problem the bypass did not solve.

Right now, too much of the world’s energy still moves through too few choke points. — Sultan Al Jaber

The adversary announced the trap six weeks before it closed. The planners built into it anyway. And the response is the same punishment-track approach that never reopened Hormuz, now applied in the same mold at the new strait — where the blockade is selective, the buffer is spent, and the billions bought a second chokepoint.