Iran's Hormuz Tolls Exposed a Deal With No Enforcement

The two sides held opposite readings of the same document from the first day. On June 25, Trump said Iran told the US there would be no tolls on Hormuz shipping. That same day, Iran's Ghalibaf said Iran would collect a fee for transit services through the strait ^[1].

What the Hormuz MoU permits

US position: Trump's reading, stated June 25 Iran has informed the US that, despite troublemaking Fake News reporting to the contrary, there are 'NO TOLLS, NO INSURANCE COSTS, & NO OTHER CHARGES OF ANY KIND BEING SOUGHT OR RECEIVED BY IRAN ON SHIPS TRAVELING THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ'

Iran position: Ghalibaf's reading, stated the same day Iran has the right to sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, and of course, we will receive a fee for services.

The memorandum of understanding gave Iran temporary management of the waterway. It included one mechanism for resolving a dispute like this: a bilateral monitoring-group communication channel, announced on June 30 by Iran's Gharibabadi ^[2].

It was decided that a direct communication channel for the monitoring group would be established by tomorrow, and that shortcomings in the implementation of the MoU would be reported, discussed and decided upon in a formal and documented manner. — Kazem Gharibabadi

That channel was three days old when the Doha talks were paused on July 3 for Khamenei's funeral, with resumption set for July 11 in Islamabad. Trump described the suspension as a courtesy ^[3][4]. During that pause, Iran moved from asserting a right to charge transit fees to announcing it would collect them. On July 5, Iran's ambassador to China said Iran would charge service fees for Hormuz transit, citing Iran's territorial waters ^[5]. The fee plan had been on Iran's own timeline since June 25. Gharibabadi warned on June 30 that Iran would proceed independently if Oman did not agree ^[6][1]. The pause did not produce Iran's decision. But the one channel that could contest it was off the clock when Iran acted. Every other mechanism that might serve as a compliance backstop falls short. The US and GCC issued a joint declaration on June 25 making trade with Iran conditional on MoU compliance, a political signal with no binding enforcement ^[1]. Oman and the IMO set up an alternative shipping corridor near the Omani shore on June 27, giving traffic a route that bypasses Iran's designated lanes. Iran contests the corridor: Araghchi asserted sole management authority over the strait, and the IRGC warned vessels against using the alternative route ^[7]. A traffic workaround that Iran threatens is not an enforcement tool. A separate crisis communication channel was established alongside the monitoring group to prevent accidental military escalation ^[2]. It exists for de-escalating incidents, not for adjudicating whether tolls violate the agreement. And the US military option, used freely before the ceasefire, went unused against a fee announcement. On July 4, Gharibabadi warned against any military movement in the waterway, hardening Iran's sovereignty posture in the diplomatic vacuum ^[4]. Iran also used the MoU's own text to block multilateral alternatives. When France and Oman proposed a joint demining operation, Gharibabadi rejected it on June 29, asserting that under the MoU demining is carried out solely by Iran and no other country ^[8]. Iran reads the deal as conferring exclusive operational authority. The US reads it as a toll-free passage commitment. Same document, opposite outcomes. Marco Rubio framed what is at stake as a question of precedent ^[9].

If in fact we accepted that you can charge money to use an international waterway because it happens to be near your territorial space, well then, this will spread throughout the world like a contagion. — Marco Rubio

The concern extends beyond Hormuz. If a country can charge tolls on an international waterway because it passes near its territorial waters, every chokepoint near any coastline becomes a potential toll booth. The bilateral channel reopens July 11 in Islamabad. By then, Iran will have been collecting fees for nearly a week under its own reading of the agreement, with no mechanism having pushed back. The question for Islamabad is not whether the two sides disagree on what the MoU permits. They have disagreed since June 25. It is whether reopening a channel that was absent when one side acted on its version can reverse facts already established on the water.