Nuclear Cooperation Is Now a Reward for U.S. Allies

In February, the United States signed a $9 billion nuclear cooperation agreement with Armenia. The deal — a 123 agreement, the mechanism Washington uses to govern civilian nuclear trade with foreign partners — was coupled from the start with the TRIPP transit corridor, a route designed to bypass Russia and Iran. A senior U.S. official described the package in terms that left little ambiguity about its purpose.

This agreement will open a new chapter in the deepening energy partnership between Armenia and the United States. — Nikol Pashinyan

The Armenia deal is the clearest instance of a pattern now visible across three theaters, because the geopolitical function is stated on its face: nuclear cooperation as a lever to pull a state from one orbit into another. The same logic, applied with varying degrees of explicitness, governs the administration's nuclear dealings with Saudi Arabia and South Korea. And its inverse — the denial of any enrichment to Iran — confirms that the logic runs both ways. On July 22, Trump signed a 30-year 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia that allows the kingdom to develop nuclear infrastructure using American firms and may permit domestic uranium enrichment after a joint study ^[1]. What the agreement omits is as significant as what it includes. There is no binding prohibition on enrichment, and the IAEA Additional Protocol — which grants inspectors the access needed to detect clandestine activity — is not required. Previous administrations had pursued nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia but insisted on the so-called gold standard: a legally binding renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing. The Trump agreement drops that standard and decouples nuclear cooperation from Saudi normalization with Israel, a condition that had been central to the Abraham Accords framework ^[1]. The administration's own internal report had proposed sharing "sensitive uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing technology" with Saudi Arabia to advance "security interests" ^[2]. Separately, the administration twice approved Part 810 authorizations allowing U.S. companies to share nuclear reactor blueprints and designs with Riyadh — disclosures Senator Tim Kaine alleged were made without the full information Congress is owed under the Atomic Energy Act ^[3]. South Korea is the third theater. Seoul has sought advance consent for uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing under its own 123 agreement for years; prior administrations declined. In late May, the two sides opened formal talks on the request ^[4]. The talks are early and no concession has been granted. But the fact that they are proceeding now — alongside a signed enrichment-permissive deal with Saudi Arabia and a $9 billion nuclear pact with Armenia — marks the shift. Three allies, each advancing toward nuclear cooperation on terms prior administrations resisted, at different stages: a signed deal for Armenia, a signed deal for Saudi Arabia, open talks for South Korea. Iran is the inverse. When Tehran proposed a nuclear framework that would have allowed enrichment at five times the JCPOA limit, Washington rejected it and offered instead free nuclear fuel forever to discourage any domestic enrichment ^[5].

One of the things we offered them was we said, we'll give you a free nuclear fuel forever. — Federal government of the United States

The peace deal signed on June 17 ended a four-month war. It lifted sanctions, removed the naval blockade, and created a $300 billion reconstruction fund — while allowing Iran to retain its ballistic missile arsenal ^[6]. The administration was willing to let Iran keep its missiles and pay for reconstruction. What it reserved for allies was nuclear technology. The three-theater pattern is unfolding inside a broader rollback. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi issued a blunt warning.

It is more important than ever to uphold the non-proliferation norms that have served the world so well for the past half century. — Rafael Grossi

In March, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor delivered its assessment.

Nuclear posturing is on autopilot. — Hans Kristensen

The deals grant nuclear technology to aligned states without the safeguards prior administrations required. The proliferation-risk assessment the old architecture enforced is now left to the receiving state.