The Strait of Hormuz Is No Longer an International Waterway

On July 13, the International Maritime Organization did something it rarely does. It looked at two belligerents in a shooting war and condemned them for the same act. Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority was requiring vessels to submit declarations and pay fees to transit waters it claimed as its own. The United States had just imposed a 20 percent transit fee on goods passing through the strait. The IMO called both "a fundamental violation of the principle of freedom of navigation" ^[1].

The cycle of escalation must end. — International Maritime Organization

The condemnation landed on both sides with equal force, and that was the point. A year earlier, the United States had gone to war to keep the Strait of Hormuz an international waterway. By the summer of 2026, it was monetizing it. The arc from one position to the other is visible in the language the administration used. In September 2025, as the Navy began clearing Iranian mines and redirecting vessels, Trump described the mission in operational terms ^[2].

100% control of the waterway. — Donald Trump

By April 2026, the language had shifted from operational to jurisdictional. Defense Secretary Hegseth made the new posture explicit ^[3].

No one sails from the Strait of Hormuz to anywhere in the world without the permission of the United States Navy — Pete Hegseth

That was no longer a blockade of Iranian shipping. It was a veto over all transit. By May, Marines from the 31st MEU were boarding tankers and 91 commercial ships had been redirected ^[4]. In August, Trump made the claim explicit ^[5].

After we finish defeating Iran, which is being very badly defeated, pretty soon I’ll be declaring the Hormuz strait a territory of the United States. — Donald Trump

On August 11, he reduced it further ^[6].

We have total control over the Hormuz Strait right now. — Donald Trump

Four rungs: clear the mines, total control, American territory, a steel wall. The rhetoric did not outrun the policy. It tracked it. Iran had been climbing the same ladder from the opposite shore. In May 2026, Tehran established the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, claiming regulatory authority over 8,800 square miles of water that encroached into Omani and UAE territorial waters. The PGSA required vessels to submit more than 40 data points and pay fees of up to $2 million, collected in yuan or Bitcoin, with the IRGC physically enforcing checkpoints ^[7].

We don't want tolls. — Donald Trump

Iran was explicit about the logic ^[8].

As a country where the Hormuz is part of its territorial waters, we will definitely charge service fees — Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli

The symmetry is exact. Both sides claim the strait as sovereign territory. Both sides charge ships to pass. Both sides enforce their claim with naval power. Neither side acknowledges the mirror. Between these two positions, six ceasefire deals collapsed in under a year. The pattern was the same each time: the agreement restored toll-free passage, one side asserted its sovereignty claim, the other declared the truce over, and the war resumed ^[9][10]. The interval between deal and collapse compressed from months to weeks to days. The July 6 Islamabad memorandums lasted barely 48 hours before Trump declared the truce over on July 8 ^[11]. Even under the signed memorandum, Iran's nuclear chief Gharibabadi stated the position plainly ^[11].

the Strait of Hormuz is under Iran's command, not the US Central Command (CENTCOM). — Kazem Gharibabadi

The deals were not failing because diplomacy is hard. They were failing because a neutral waterway with no sovereign owner is incompatible with both sides' endstates. Each side needs the other to accept its jurisdiction, and neither can. The contradiction is sharpest inside the administration's own words. In late June, Vice President Vance made the red line clear ^[12].

In fact, I feel quite confident that we’re not gonna have a tolled Strait of Hormuz in the future — JD Vance

Secretary of State Rubio described the goal in similar terms.

We need to get back to what the straits looked like before this conflict. — Marco Rubio

Both men were speaking from the same diplomatic playbook ^[12]. Within weeks, the administration had imposed its own 20 percent transit fee on goods passing through the strait ^[1]. The US was now doing the thing Vance said the war would prevent and the thing Rubio said the war would undo. The Gulf states have drawn their own conclusion. Saudi Arabia is building export capacity through Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE is expanding Fujairah with a $3 billion pipeline. Iraq has signed $60 billion in deals to route oil through Turkey, Syria, and Jordan ^[13]. They are not choosing between the American claim and the Iranian one. They are exiting the strait entirely. The pre-war framework is dead. The United States went to war to defend an international waterway and is ending the conflict having claimed it as national territory. Iran went to war to assert its own sovereignty and has built the bureaucratic and military apparatus to enforce it. Both sides have now staked claims that require the old framework's absence. The subject of six rounds of diplomacy no longer exists.