The Administration Is Buying Out Wind Farms to Redirect the Money Into Gas and Nuclear

The United States government is now the single largest buyer of cancelled offshore wind projects in the country. Since January, the Trump administration has paid more than $2.5 billion to terminate at least nine offshore wind leases — most recently $129 million to Duke Energy for its Carolina Long Bay lease on June 29 ^[1], $765 million to Invenergy for four leases on June 17 ^[2], and roughly $928 million to TotalEnergies in late May ^[3]. The money does not simply vanish the projects. Each settlement directs the payout into fossil-fuel or non-renewable generation — in practice, natural gas, LNG, and in some cases advanced nuclear and geothermal. The Invenergy settlement requires the $765 million to be reinvested in geothermal and natural-gas-fired power plants ^[2]. TotalEnergies must channel its nearly $1 billion payout toward an LNG plant in Texas ^[3]. Duke Energy's $129 million is earmarked for advanced nuclear, natural gas generation, and grid enhancements ^[1]. The effect is a direct conversion of federal offshore wind commitments into gas and nuclear infrastructure, executed through voluntary settlements rather than the unilateral executive orders courts have blocked. Those court losses shaped the path here. The administration's first-day attempt to cancel $35 billion in offshore wind projects was ruled "arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful," and the administration dropped its appeal on June 16 ^[4]. A separate order blocking construction halts on five East Coast wind projects was also upheld ^[5]. After those losses, the administration has relied on voluntary lease settlements paid from the Treasury Judgment Fund and Defense Production Act authorities — mechanisms that, so far, courts have not been asked to block. The buyouts are the most visible prong of a three-part liquidation of federal green-energy investment. The second prong is the systematic termination of renewable subsidies. On July 4, Trump signed an executive order permanently ending federal tax subsidies for new wind and solar projects, directing Treasury to close loopholes and ordering Interior to eliminate preferential treatment for renewables over what the order calls "dispatchable" sources ^[6]. The Department of Energy has begun cancelling loan obligations for wind and solar projects. The Rural Energy for America Program, which provided federal grants for on-farm renewable installations, has been halted ^[7]. The third prong is the rollback of pollution rules that constrain fossil-fuel operations. The EPA under Lee Zeldin has proposed weakening coal ash disposal regulations — easing groundwater monitoring and rolling back cleanup requirements ^[8]. It has proposed rolling back coal plant wastewater standards. And it is accelerating clean-air permit reviews for large polluters, with EPA's Aaron Szabo arguing the Clean Air Act has been "used as an excuse to slow walk projects" ^[9]. The administration has also used national security certifications from Defense Secretary Hegseth to exempt oil and gas drilling from the Endangered Species Act in the Gulf of Mexico and Alaska ^[10]. Running alongside all three prongs is a separate but parallel track: a $700 million coal expansion funded through the Defense Production Act, using what the administration describes as repurposed environmental funds ^[11]. The money is split among upgrading 13 existing coal plants, building the first new U.S. coal plants since 2013 in Alaska and West Virginia, and constructing a coal export terminal in Oakland. Interior Secretary Burgum claimed the administration has done "more to save, protect and expand coal than any administration, perhaps, ever" ^[11]. The connective thread across the deregulatory and fossil-fuel expansion efforts is the explicit invocation of AI data-center electricity demand. Zeldin made the link directly when rolling back coal plant wastewater standards:

The AI and data center revolution is creating an electricity and baseload power demand that cannot be met under the overly restrictive policies of past administrations. — Lee Zeldin

The administration has designated data centers as critical national security infrastructure, with over 1,500 facilities in development ^[12]. In April, Trump convened tech giants including Microsoft, Meta, OpenAI, and Amazon to sign a voluntary "Ratepayer Protection Pledge" requiring them to fund their own power infrastructure ^[13]. The practical result is visible at the state level: Entergy is purchasing the Cottonwood gas-fired power plant in Texas for $1.8 billion, a deal critics say is primarily needed to serve a Meta data center in north Louisiana ^[14]. Wyoming's governor signed a framework requiring data center developers to bear the full cost of their own power, as Microsoft proposes a 3,200-acre expansion in Cheyenne ^[15]. The demand is real; the question is what gets built to meet it. The administration has also set an aspirational target of quadrupling nuclear capacity to 400 gigawatts by 2050, and Constellation is recommissioning Three Mile Island for Microsoft under a 20-year power purchase agreement ^[16]. But the near-term capital flow tells a different story: the money moving today is overwhelmingly going to natural gas, LNG, and coal. The market, meanwhile, is running in the opposite direction. In May, solar power surpassed coal as America's third-largest electricity source — 12.8% of generation versus coal's 12.2% ^[17]. Solar and battery storage still constituted 91% of new generating capacity in the first quarter of 2026, and 74% of that new clean capacity was installed in states Trump won ^[17]. The economics of cheap solar and battery storage are pulling utilities toward renewables even as federal policy pushes the other way. That tension is what makes the policy consequential. The administration cannot make solar expensive again, but it can determine what fills the gap between renewable generation and rising demand. By buying out wind leases and redirecting the capital, by killing subsidies that narrow the cost gap, and by clearing the regulatory path for fossil fuels, it is ensuring that the next wave of power plants built to serve data centers will burn gas and coal rather than harness wind and sun. The courts have blocked the most aggressive unilateral actions, but the settlements and the DPA have, so far, operated in the space the judiciary has not reached.