How the Same Hormuz Deal Says Opposite Things to Iran and America

In late June, Donald Trump announced that Iran had agreed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Of course, international regulations will be observed, but Iran will administer the Strait of Hormuz. — Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf

The same week, Iran's parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, described the arrangement to lawmakers in Tehran.

Iran has informed the US that, despite troublemaking Fake News reporting to the contrary, there are 'NO TOLLS, NO INSURANCE COSTS, & NO OTHER CHARGES OF ANY KIND BEING SOUGHT OR RECEIVED BY IRAN ON SHIPS TRAVELING THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ' — Donald Trump

The two men were describing the same agreement. This was not one confused deal. It was the fourth time in ten months that a Hormuz negotiation had produced an arrangement ambiguous enough for both sides to claim directly contradictory things. In October 2025, Trump halted planned strikes and declared a deal near; Iran denied anything was final ^[1]. On June 11, the Islamabad memorandum linked strait reopening to nuclear concessions; Iran's foreign minister said no final decision had been reached while Trump insisted the leaks bore "NOTHING to do with the terms that were agreed to, in writing" ^[2]. On June 26, the Switzerland arrangement reopened the waterway but left the toll question so unsettled that Oman told European officials ships "may face fees for navigation assistance or de-pollution services" while Secretary of State Marco Rubio demanded the strait remain toll-free ^[3]. And on August 3, Trump canceled a major military assault because "the perimeters of a deal has been agreed to," even as Iran's foreign ministry denied any negotiations with Washington and insisted the strait "will not return to its pre-war status" ^[4]. Each iteration follows the same rhythm. Trump announces a breakthrough and cancels military action. Iran denies anything is final. The strait reopens partially. In the cases where enough time has passed to observe the aftermath, the arrangement frays within weeks. The June 12 ceasefire collapsed when military tensions flared again in late June ^[5]. After the June 26 deal, shipping volumes through Hormuz fell from roughly 45 daily transits to approximately 13 by late July, with Iran diverting ships at gunpoint to its own corridor ^[6]. The October 2025 and August 3 iterations are too distant or too recent to trace the same arc, but the pattern is now familiar enough that markets have learned to price it: Brent crude fell nearly 5 percent on August 3 when Trump halted the attack and said an agreement was close ^[7]. The ambiguity persists because both sides extract something from it that a clear settlement would foreclose. On the Iranian side, each pause in hostilities has been converted into permanent administrative architecture. In April, Iran's parliament passed legislation requiring rial-denominated transit tolls and designating the military as the strait's legal authority ^[8]. In May, Tehran launched the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, a regulatory body that began clearing commercial vessels through IRGC security checkpoints and opened a social media account for "real-time updates on Hormuz Strait operations" ^[9]. In June, Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref told a Beijing forum that Iran had "moved from a state of vulnerability to sanctions to a position of authority in supplying global needs" and offered China special fee considerations ^[10]. In July, Iran and Oman jointly proposed formal transit tolls, with market analysts warning that permanent fees on a corridor handling roughly 20 percent of global traded oil could be "a more potent economic weapon than military escalation" ^[11]. Each deal buys Iran time, and Iran uses that time to build institutions that outlast the deal. On the American side, the incentive to leave things unresolved is equally clear. Vice President JD Vance stated the logic plainly after the war ended.

If we don’t make the final deal, their nuclear program is still destroyed. They’re still much weaker as a country, so my attitude is America wins either way. — JD Vance

The military campaign — which cost the United States $30 billion and Gulf states $58 billion — dismantled Iran's nuclear program and sank its navy, even if it failed to overthrow the regime or dismantle the IRGC ^[12]. The threat of walking away from any negotiation is itself the leverage. A settled strait, with clear rules and a recognized administrator, is a strait the United States can no longer use to extract nuclear concessions. The ambiguity preserves the threat: Iran's nuclear program remains dismantled, its navy sunk, and the U.S. can walk away from any negotiation without losing what it has already gained. The result is a cycle that feeds itself. Iran needs the ambiguity to keep converting military control into economic authority — tolls, service fees, the legal claim to administer a waterway that carries roughly 20 percent of the world's traded oil. The United States needs the ambiguity to keep the nuclear file open without committing to a permanent settlement. Neither side has an interest in clarity, so clarity never arrives. Every deal leaves the question of who administers the Strait of Hormuz unanswered. And every unanswered administration dispute is the seed of the next closure. The next closure will not look like the first. Iran now has a toll law, a regulatory authority, a bilateral coordination framework with Oman, and a legal argument that the strait's traffic separation scheme belongs in its territorial waters. Each deal has given Tehran more to defend, and less reason to accept a settlement that takes any of it away.