The Strait of Hormuz's Real Operating System Is a US-Iran Deal, Not Any Sovereignty Claim

On June 12, Iran's Revolutionary Guard Navy closed the Strait of Hormuz, confronting an oil tanker with explosions audible in Sirik County and warning that any vessel attempting passage would be confronted ^[1]. Ten days later, the waterway was reopening. What changed was not a legal ruling, a UN resolution, or a mutual recognition of anyone's territorial claim. It was a US sanctions waiver, issued June 22, that lets Iran sell oil again — on the explicit condition that Iran ensure "free and open transit" through the strait ^[2]. Iran's oil minister confirmed the bargain: sanctions lifted for 60 days, oil flows nearly back to pre-war levels, based on "certain understandings" reached with the American side ^[2]. In the one sequence this crisis produced, Iran closed the waterway when it had no economic stake in keeping it open, and traffic returned when the waiver gave it one. Tanker transits jumped roughly 54% the week of the waiver; 24 commodity vessels passed through on June 30 ^[3]. That is the mechanism the evidence supports: a bilateral economic exchange between Washington and Tehran, not any of the sovereignty frameworks proliferating around it. And they are proliferating. Iran built the most elaborate. On May 18 it established the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, which requires vessels to seek authorization, pay fees, and submit to affiliation checks against US and Israel links. Some ships paid — in Bitcoin, up to $2 million per vessel, through a Bitcoin-backed insurance platform called "Hormuz Safe" projecting over $10 billion in revenue ^[4]. Iran even floated licensing fees on submarine internet cables carrying 15-20% of global internet and financial data ^[5]. European countries began negotiating transit directly with the IRGC Navy, following bilateral deals already cut with Chinese, Japanese, and Pakistani operators ^[5]. The Supreme National Security Council reviews transit requests; 25-33 commercial vessels transited daily under this system in late May ^[6]. But the toll regime is selective, not universal. Ships that cooperate get access; ships that don't are excluded. Many vessels disabled their AIS transponders to bypass the system entirely ^[7]. And the whole apparatus operates inside the waiver framework, which requires free transit — meaning Iran is collecting tolls with one hand while bound by a deal that says passage must be open with the other. The IRGC, the military force that physically controls the strait, is also a primary commercial beneficiary of the reopening through its sprawling empire in oil, shipping, and telecommunications ^[8]. The organization that can close the waterway profits from keeping it open. The US built competing infrastructure that failed to operationalize. A $40 billion maritime insurance program run through the DFC and the insurer Chubb has issued zero active policies — there are no active policies at this time, because naval escorts are unavailable ^[4]. The escorts that did launch were judged by the International Maritime Organization as "not a sustainable solution" ^[9]. The IMO called for "a long-term agreement," effectively acknowledging that neither US military escorts nor Iran's toll regime constitute durable governance ^[9]. Into this gap stepped Oman, in the most elaborate attempt by a Gulf state to profit from the Hormuz risk rather than simply hedge against it. The arc runs six weeks. On June 4, Iran's foreign minister Araghchi announced Iran and Oman would "jointly manage" the strait, citing the "natural right" of the two bordering nations ^[10]. By June 23, they formed a joint committee, initially committed to toll-free passage ^[11]. On June 27, at a joint US-GCC meeting in Bahrain, Oman's foreign minister publicly stated Oman would not impose transit fees to ensure free navigation ^[12]. Three days later, the same minister proposed "maritime service fees" — voluntary payments for navigational safety and environmental protection, which he argued were categorically different from transit tolls ^[13].

there is a clear distinction between transit fees and maritime, environmental, and navigational services that may be discussed voluntarily with the benefiting states and companies — Badr bin Hamad bin Hamoud Al Busaidi

The semantic pivot was rejected by all three competing camps. The US collapsed the distinction immediately. Marco Rubio called fees and tolls "the same thing" and said there isn't a nation on Earth that supports paying to transit the strait ^[13]. Trump labeled the fees unacceptable and threatened Oman directly: cooperate like everybody else, or face the consequences ^[14]. The GCC, Oman's own partners, issued a declaration in Manama rejecting any attempt to impose charges on the waterway, calling unrestricted navigation essential for global security. Rubio warned that allowing coastal states to toll international waterways would "spread throughout the world like a contagion" ^[15]. And Iran, which nominally supported Oman's proposal, wanted the payments to be mandatory, not voluntary — with Deputy Foreign Minister Gharibabadi warning that if Oman doesn't establish a joint framework, Iran will implement its own plan independently ^[13].

If Muscat chooses not to establish a joint framework for the future governance of the Strait of Hormuz, the Islamic Republic will proceed with implementing its own plan independently. — Kazem Gharibabadi

Iran's own position hardened across the same arc. Initially committed to toll-free passage in the Oman committee, parliament speaker Ghalibaf declared by June 25 that administration of the strait "will never go back to the way it was before the war" ^[16]. By June 27, Araghchi asserted sole Iranian management: this responsibility rests on the Islamic Republic, and there is no other party or state in this respect ^[12]. Iran rejected every multilateral alternative in parallel — the Oman-IMO shipping corridor would "increase tensions," the French-Omani demining coalition was a "provocation," and Araghchi proposed a regional security framework "without the presence or interference of any country from outside the region," meaning the US ^[12][17]. The head of Iran's Parliament National Security committee dismissed the GCC declaration as interference, calling strait management "exclusively an Iranian sovereign right" ^[15]. So the pattern: every claimant is constrained from fully operationalizing its position. Iran's PGSA collects some tolls but is selective, leaky, and contingent on a waiver that requires free transit — and the force controlling the strait profits from keeping it open. The US insurance program issued zero policies, and the IMO calls escorts unsustainable. Oman's fee proposal was rejected by the US, the GCC, and Iran. The GCC declaration has no enforcement mechanism without US power. Claims proliferate; none becomes durable governance. The sovereignty claims are leverage in negotiation, not governance of traffic. The operating system is the deal between the two parties whose confrontation created the risk — and every Gulf state, including Oman, is outside it. The strait runs on what Washington and Tehran agreed between themselves. Everything else is paper.