America's Nuclear Bargains Are Eroding the Rules They Depend On

In late March, the Trump administration circulated a report proposing to share uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing technology with Saudi Arabia ^[1]. The same capability — the ability to produce fissile material — was the red line whose pursuit by Iran triggered American military strikes. The administration did not publicly reconcile the two positions.

It is more important than ever to uphold the non-proliferation norms that have served the world so well for the past half century. — Rafael Grossi

That is Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, speaking in March. He was naming what the administration's own report made visible: a shift in how the world's largest nuclear power conducts its nuclear diplomacy. The instruments of collective security — treaties, technology-sharing rules, sanctions relief, alliance deterrence — are being converted, one by one, into bilateral bargaining chips. The pattern is not total; the United States still runs trilateral military exercises with South Korea and Japan and shares intelligence to counter North Korea's nuclear threats ^[2]. But the instruments the administration has chosen to renegotiate follow the same logic. Consider the Iran deal. In May, Trump conditioned a nuclear agreement on the mandatory expansion of the Abraham Accords, demanding Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain normalize relations with Israel ^[3].

We'd like to have them immediately join the Abraham Accords ... I'm not sure we should make the deal if they don't sign. — Donald Trump

The nuclear terms — zero enrichment, missile limits, the destruction of roughly a thousand pounds of highly enriched uranium — were bundled with unrelated geopolitical concessions: toll-free maritime access through the Strait of Hormuz, energy-market stabilization before the midterms, and the normalization of seven Arab states with Israel ^[4][3][5]. Non-proliferation was not the sole objective; it was one deliverable in a package whose center of gravity lay elsewhere. The same logic appeared in East Asia. In February, the administration raised reciprocal tariffs on South Korean goods from 15 to 25 percent while pressing Seoul for a $350 billion investment pledge targeting nuclear energy ^[6]. By June, US and South Korean negotiators were in Seoul discussing revisions to the 2015 "123 Agreement" to grant South Korea advance consent for uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing ^[7]. Nuclear technology was a trade chip. In Europe, the substitution was starker. The administration discussed expanding NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements to Poland and the Baltic states even as it canceled a 4,000-troop rotation to Poland and withdrew 5,000 soldiers from Germany ^[8]. Nuclear deterrence was being offered in place of conventional commitment. In June, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group agreed to modernize the alliance's nuclear capabilities ^[9].

NPG Ministers agreed to continue enhancing NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission by modernizing NATO’s nuclear capabilities, strengthening its nuclear planning capacity, and adapting to achieve its security interests. — Nuclear Planning Group

Each of these moves can be defended on its own terms. A nuclear deal with Iran that also stabilizes the region is more durable than one that does not. Allies that share the burden of deterrence reduce the cost to the American taxpayer. The problem is not that any single deal fails — the problem is what the pattern teaches everyone watching. In May, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference deadlocked for the third consecutive time. The last successful review was roughly sixteen years ago. The United States insisted on anti-Iran language; Iran demanded its removal; the forum collapsed. The UN disarmament chief, Izumi Nakamitsu, was blunt ^[10].

Non-proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin. — Izumi Nakamitsu

The NPT is the treaty that, for half a century, persuaded dozens of countries that they did not need their own nuclear weapons because the nuclear-armed states would work toward eliminating theirs. The United States used its review conference this year as an adversarial forum — a place to isolate Iran, not to sustain the consensus that makes isolation meaningful. In February, New START expired. Trump declined Putin's offer of a one-year extension, calling the treaty badly negotiated and promising a better one ^[11]. Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that bilateral treaties are obsolete and any future architecture must include China, while pledging the US would maintain a robust and modernized deterrent ^[11]. For the first time since 1972, American and Russian strategic nuclear forces operate under no mutual limits. Christine Wormuth, a former Army secretary now at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, called the lapse a missed opportunity ^[12]. The allies are not waiting to be bargained with. In June, Finland's parliament voted 125 to 61 to lift the country's decades-long ban on nuclear weapons, clearing the way for NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements ^[13]. In February, Sweden's prime minister said that as long as Russia has nuclear weapons nearby, it is good that European democracies also have them, and his defense minister added that in wartime Sweden would consider any option for survival ^[14]. Neither country was offered a deal. Both watched the treaty environment collapse and adjusted accordingly. The global ready-warhead count rose to 9,745 this year, up 141 from 2024. All nine nuclear-armed states are modernizing or expanding their arsenals. Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists put it plainly: the era of nuclear reduction is over ^[15]. The rise coincides with the administration's transactional turn but cannot be attributed to it alone — China's buildup, Russia's modernization, and North Korea's program all have independent drivers. What the administration's approach does is remove the arguments other states once had for restraint. Each bilateral deal works on its own terms. The June agreement with Iran produced a tactical pause in military hostilities, reopened the Strait of Hormuz, and eased pressure on energy markets ^[16]. The South Korea talks advanced. The NATO nuclear posture hardened. But each deal also teaches another state something the non-proliferation system was built to make unthinkable: that nuclear restraint is a bargaining position, not a shared commitment. The allies and adversaries the deals do not include are already reaching for options the system was supposed to make unnecessary. The administration is getting its deals. The system those deals depend on is what the deals spend down.