The Limits of India's Strategic Autonomy

In March, at New Delhi's Raisina Dialogue, India's foreign ministry staged a piece of diplomatic theater: the Iranian foreign minister and the Israeli foreign minister, both welcomed under the same roof, both received with the same calibrated warmth ^[1]. It was the physical embodiment of "strategic autonomy" — the doctrine that India can be friends with every rival power by taking no side. Weeks earlier, Prime Minister Modi had stood in Jerusalem and said something that made the theater harder to sustain.

India stands with Israel, firmly, with full conviction, in this moment and beyond. — Narendra Modi

Modi was serving as chair of BRICS at the time. The contradiction was not subtle, and its consequences arrived quickly. When Iran pushed BRICS to condemn the US-Israel strikes on its territory, India — as chair — resisted. Three draft statements failed to reach consensus. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both BRICS members hosting American bases, had their own reasons for blocking condemnation, but the fracture happened on India's watch, under a chair that had already declared its tilt ^[2][3]. India then co-sponsored a UN Security Council resolution condemning Iranian attacks on GCC countries — a move that was not neutral, not balancing, and not what a bridge between fragmented blocs would do. The diplomatic cost was not abstract. While India positioned itself as the natural mediator in West Asia, Pakistan took the role. Islamabad brokered the US-Iran talks, and Congress leader Jairam Ramesh called it something India's foreign policy establishment could not easily dismiss.

If these reports are true, they represent a severe setback and rebuff to India - and it is all attributable to the self-styled Vishwaguru. — Jairam Ramesh

Rahul Gandhi went further, accusing Modi of turning foreign policy into "Modi's personal project" and following US and Israeli directives ^[4]. Modi's response was the language of a bystander — patience, restraint, and calmness — not a mediator. The country that had hosted both foreign ministers under one roof was watching from the sidelines while its rival sat at the table. The energy story runs on a parallel track and tells the same tale from a different angle. India's de-risking is real and substantial: a 250-million-barrel strategic buffer covering 70 to 74 days of consumption, crude sourced from roughly 40 countries, and Hormuz dependency cut from 50 percent to somewhere between 20 and 40 percent ^[5]. Jaishankar, speaking at IIM Raibel in April, framed the strategy plainly: building robust national capabilities is the most effective way of de-risking and developing leverage ^[6]. The government declared that India's energy security no longer rose and fell with any single maritime chokepoint. But the diversification away from Russian crude — a centerpiece of that de-risking — was not entirely India's choice. After the US sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil in November 2025, Reliance stopped processing Russian oil at its Jamnagar refinery. Hindustan Petroleum and MRPL ceased imports. Former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal predicted a 50 percent reduction and noted that Indian companies and banks "will be loath to attract US sanctions" ^[7]. Some of the autonomy in India's energy strategy was compliance dressed in the language of prudence. The Chabahar port crystallizes the squeeze. India invested $120 million in the Iranian port as a strategic gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. The US granted a six-month sanctions waiver, which expired in April 2026. With the waiver gone and Trump threatening 25 percent tariffs on any nation doing business with Iran, India began discussing a plan to divest its stake to an Iranian entity — with a guarantee of transfer back once sanctions lift ^[8]. The foreign ministry confirmed the issue was "under discussion with both Iran and the United States," adding that the current conflict was a complicating factor. A country that calls itself a global anchor for stability was considering handing over its own strategic asset to avoid American punishment, hoping to reclaim it later. That is not autonomy. That is triage. The deepest contradiction sits not in diplomacy or energy but in the gap between how India presents itself to the world and what it contends with at home. Carnegie South Asia's Milan Vaishnav labeled India "a global anchor for stability and an emerging critical node in global technology supply chains" ^[9]. The Times of Israel called it a global center of gravity and a unique bridge between fragmented competing blocs ^[10]. Meanwhile, India deployed elite CoBRA battalions — reallocated from anti-Maoist operations — to Manipur, where more than 260 people have been killed and thousands displaced since May 2023 ^[11]. Economic blockades have cut national highways. The NIA is investigating missing persons. A country projecting stability abroad is fighting a jungle war within its own borders. And then there is the Vivekananda International Foundation. The think tank was founded by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, the architect of India's hard-power doctrine. In March 2026, it issued a warning: India must prepare for persistent American interference in its domestic affairs, both covert and overt, and boost counterintelligence coverage of US activities including NGOs and media ^[12]. It characterized a speech by US Secretary of State Rubio as promoting neo-imperialism and gunboat diplomacy.

The events of 28 February 2026 show how unbridled US power can prove threatening for any region's stability. — Vivekananda International Foundation

This is the same United States with which India is pursuing a $500 billion trade deal, positioning itself as the primary beneficiary of American companies reducing their China dependence ^[13]. India's own national security apparatus treats the US as a sovereignty threat while the commerce ministry courts its investment. The contradiction is not hidden in a classified file — it is published, on the record, by a think tank founded by the NSA. None of this was created by the US-Iran conflict. The China thaw began with the October 2024 disengagement pact at Depsang and Demchok, well before the first American strike on Iranian soil ^[14]. The border trade that resumed today through Shipki La and Nathu La — the first since the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes — is the latest step in a process that predates the West Asian crisis ^[15]. US tariff pressure under Trump also drove the rapprochement: some reports explicitly note that American trade policies pushed the two major developing economies toward economic stability ^[16]. The conflict did not cause the contradictions. It made them visible. And the visibility carries its own cost. The US tolerates India's hedging not because the posture is convincing but because the alternative is worse. Republican Congressman McCormick defended Modi's Russian oil purchases as "in India's best national interest" and warned that alienating India would cause "big trouble for all of us" ^[17]. Congressman Bera confirmed that America is not creating a strategic partnership with Pakistan — all investments flow to India. McCormick warned that restricting India's access to US technology could push New Delhi toward Chinese alternatives. The American tolerance is itself a form of leverage India does not control. It is dependence wearing the costume of autonomy. Some of India's de-risking was enabled by the very power its strategic establishment warns against. The US Treasury issued a 30-day emergency waiver for Russian crude at sea in April 2026 after specific requests from India, Indonesia, and Malaysia ^[18]. Treasury stated it wanted to ensure oil was available to those who needed it as Iran negotiations accelerated. India's energy buffer was built partly with American cooperation — the same America the VIF describes as a threat to sovereignty. In April, the Ministry of External Affairs briefed the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs on the Iran conflict. Seventeen MPs raised concerns about geopolitics, energy security, Pakistan's mediation role, and the Strait of Hormuz disruption ^[19]. After the briefing, Congress MP Shashi Tharoor — a defender of multi-alignment who calls it responsible statecraft — said something that did not make it into any government white paper.

It was a very good briefing with the Foreign Secretary on all the issues to deal with the Iran war that were not covered in the earlier briefing when he was himself not present. — Shashi Tharoor

Even India's own legislators understand that the posture cannot bear scrutiny.