Who Can Sign for Iran?

On Thursday, August 6, President Masoud Pezeshkian stood before Iran's parliament and projected unity. "Now is the best time to reach an agreement," he said, describing his government as "steadfast under the authority of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei."

Now is the best time to reach an agreement, as there is solidarity, power and unity in the country. — Masoud Pezeshkian

Two days later, Pezeshkian reported that he could not reach that same supreme leader. "It is very difficult to communicate with him at the moment," he told mediators, even though the Supreme Leader's "final approval is required" for any deal on the Strait of Hormuz. ^[1]

It is very difficult to communicate with him at the moment, but in any case, his presence is a very great source of strength for us so that we can continue. — Masoud Pezeshkian

By Sunday, the IRGC had blocked the strait. ^[2] The 48-hour whiplash — from deal-readiness to communication breakdown to military closure — is what the post-Khamenei system now produces. Khamenei's death in March dismantled the single-authority structure that made US-Iran deal-making possible. What remains is a state where no official can sign an agreement and bind the others to it. Two ceasefires have collapsed in six weeks, and a third is now being undermined — each by a different node of the Iranian state. The first was the most promising. On June 30, Trump and Pezeshkian signed a 14-point memorandum of understanding, and within days tanker traffic through Hormuz returned to pre-war levels. Iran exported over 40 million barrels of oil. ^[3] But the agreement began to fray almost immediately. Trump revoked oil sanctions waivers and demanded Iran surrender its uranium stockpile as non-negotiable. By July 10, he had declared "the Cease Fire is OVER." ^[4] Then, on July 16, Mojtaba Khamenei called the president's signature "worthless" — and the IRGC, operating independently, began intercepting ships in the strait. ^[5]

We're going to knock out all their power plants, we're going to knock out all their bridges unless they get to the table and negotiate. — Donald Trump

The pattern was set. The president signed. The supreme leader voided the signature. The military acted on pre-set orders. Washington contributed its own reversals, but the structural problem was Iranian: even if the US had held steady, Pezeshkian's signature could not bind Mojtaba, and Mojtaba's rejection could not restrain the IRGC. A second ceasefire, mediated by Pakistan and Qatar in late July, collapsed even faster. On July 28, Iran rejected the deal and launched missile strikes against US positions. ^[6] This time the rejection appears to have come from the security apparatus — the Supreme National Security Council, now led by Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, who by August was setting six hardline conditions for reopening the strait. ^[7][2]

Until America corrects its behavior, the Strait of Hormuz will not be reopened. — Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr

The SNSC is not the supreme leader's office, and Zolghadr is not Mojtaba. It was yet another authority speaking for Iran. The third cycle is still unfolding, and a fourth authority has entered the fray. While Pezeshkian negotiates with Oman and Trump claims a deal is imminent, Iran's parliament is reviewing legislation to permanently ban US and Israeli vessels from the strait. ^[8] The bill may not pass, but its existence is the point: the parliament is pulling in the opposite direction from the president, and no one can tell it to stop. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has confirmed what the pattern suggests. IRGC units in the strait, he explained, operate on "general instructions given to them in advance, rather than direct, real-time command from the current political leadership."

These units are operating based on general instructions given to them in advance, rather than direct, real-time command from the current political leadership. — Abbas Araghchi

Even a signed deal, in other words, may not bind the forces on the water. The fragmentation is not chaos. It is the predictable output of a succession design that Khamenei himself set in motion. In February, facing the prospect of war, he established a four-layer succession plan that delegated operational control to Ali Larijani as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. ^[9] But Larijani lacked the clerical rank to become permanent supreme leader — creating a structural gap between operational authority and formal legitimacy. After Khamenei's death in March, the IRGC seized wartime decision-making and decentralized command three ranks down. ^[10] Mojtaba Khamenei succeeded his father but has not appeared publicly since, reportedly injured in US-Israeli strikes and, according to US intelligence, "significantly more interested in acquiring nuclear weapons than his father." ^[11][12] By August, Larijani had vanished from the public record entirely, replaced at the SNSC by Zolghadr. ^[13][7] Mediators describe a process that has broken down at the most basic level.

communication with the supreme leader is "very difficult" — Masoud Pezeshkian

Iran has resorted to delivering handwritten notes by aircraft to prevent intelligence breaches. ^[1] At least six different Iranian figures are now speaking for the state on Hormuz with divergent messages. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, described in some channels as "chief negotiator," dismisses US diplomacy as "theater." ^[14] Araghchi negotiates with Oman but says a shipping understanding "does not mean the full reopening." ^[15] Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei denies direct talks with Washington. ^[16] Zolghadr sets hardline conditions. The IRGC claims the US was "humiliated." Pezeshkian credits the "new Supreme Leader." And Mojtaba Khamenei himself has said nothing publicly. ^[2][17] Trump is still negotiating as if post-Khamenei Iran has a single throat to choke. The premise of the original diplomatic push — Rubio seeking a direct Trump-Khamenei meeting, the pursuit of "JCPOA 2" — was that a supreme leader could sign and bind the system. ^[18] That premise is gone. The question for the next deal is not whether it will hold but which Iranian authority will be the one to invalidate it.