The Trap in Phase Two

The second phase of the Trump Peace Plan rested on two conditions that formed a closed loop. Israel would withdraw from Gaza only after Hamas disarmed completely. Hamas would disarm only after Israel complied fully with the ceasefire. Neither would go first. No one could make them. Benjamin Netanyahu made the Israeli position explicit as the plan moved to phase two.

I’m hearing even now claims that Gaza’s reconstruction will be allowed before demilitarization; this will not happen. — Benjamin Netanyahu

Hamas made its own position equally clear: disarmament was contingent on Israel first halting all strikes and fully implementing the ceasefire ^[1][2]. The Board of Peace, the U.S.-led body tasked with overseeing the transition, held no enforcement mechanism to break the deadlock ^[3]. Each party filled the gap with action. Israel expanded its control of Gaza from the 53 percent allowed under the ceasefire to 70 percent. Netanyahu's directive was blunt.

My directive is to move to 70% control of the Gaza Strip. — Benjamin Netanyahu

It conducted airstrikes it called "routine activities" under the truce. By August 1, 2026, 1,222 Palestinians had been killed since the ceasefire took effect the previous October, with July recording the highest monthly toll of the year at 152 ^[4][5]. On the Lebanon front, under a separate U.S.-brokered ceasefire, Netanyahu claimed "freedom of action" to continue bombing: what obliged Israel, he said, was "the security of our soldiers, and the security of our communities" ^[6]. Hamas filled the gap differently. It called up 7,000 fighters, resumed recruiting and rearming, and used what one report described as "ISIS-like" violence against opposing clans to reassert control ^[7]. Its leaders rejected disarmament as a "red line" and dismissed peace proposals as "a waste of time and vain endeavours" ^[7]. The Board of Peace was supposed to be the bridge between these two positions. Instead it became a third actor in the trap. In May 2026, it signaled it would no longer hold Israel to ceasefire terms if Hamas rejected disarmament, effectively giving Israel a green light to resume military operations ^[3]. In June, it sought broad legal immunity for its members, staff, and contractors in Gaza: protection from arrest, detention, and legal proceedings in Gazan courts, plus the right to use Palestinian public property without compensation ^[8]. And it began implementing reconstruction projects only in areas Hamas did not control, partitioning Gaza by cooperation rather than by design ^[9]. On August 2, 2026, the trap reached its logical endpoint. Israel formally rejected Trump's own disarmament plan. Netanyahu's office declared the public version "does not reflect its positions" and demanded the right to continue military operations in Gaza ^[10].

Our assessment is that if we redeploy before Hamas is truly disarmed, it will quickly expand its presence throughout Gaza, rebuild its terrorist infrastructure, once again threaten Israeli communities, and seek to carry out another Oct. 7-style attack. — Doron Spielman

The party that had insisted disarmament was the gate to peace had now rejected the plan that was supposed to enforce it. The Board's own envoy, Nickolay Mladenov, had already seen the endpoint from inside the mechanism.

And at that point, it really doesn't matter where the yellow line is, but Gaza is gone. — Nickolay Mladenov