Washington Is Turning Its Allies Into Customers
The pivot to Asia is real in ships and stockpiles — but by pricing every alliance as a separate deal, Washington is teaching its partners to defend themselves without it.
In March, at Seongju, workers disassembled the six THAAD missile-defense launchers that had watched the sky over South Korea since 2017 and shipped them out to the Middle East. The Pentagon's new strategy had already reassigned the American force in Korea from defending the peninsula to countering China, and Washington declared Seoul capable of taking primary responsibility for its own defense [1]. Days later, the South Korean president answered.
We have expressed opposition to US Forces Korea transferring some air defense weapons according to its own military needs, but the stark reality is that we can’t always dictate our own terms. — Lee Jae Myung
He ordered the military to win back wartime operational control from the American-led command, with a deadline attached. Taiwan learned the same lesson by watching its arms orders sit. At the Washington summit in July, President Trump held a $14 billion weapons package in abeyance while extending a trade truce with Xi Jinping; at Beijing in May he had done the same with an $11 billion package [2][3]. By November he was still describing the sales in one phrase [4].
a very good negotiating chip — Donald Trump
The State Department moved to reassure, but the reassurance carried its own expiration date.
US policy on the issue of Taiwan is unchanged as of today. — Marco Rubio
Taiwan's opposition party chairwoman flew to meet Xi, and China answered with ten incentives to revive cross-strait trade; Japan and Australia, not waiting, signed a $7 billion stealth-frigate deal [5]. India's turn came through tariffs. New Delhi had called off the Quad summit it was to host in November 2025, bristling at Trump's repeated claim to have stopped an India-Pakistan war [6]. Talks collapsed in August 2025, U.S. tariffs climbed to 50 percent, then fell to 18 percent under a February 2026 framework [7]. By late October the two sides had finalized a deal committing India to $500 billion in purchases of American energy, technology and aircraft over five years [7]. In the same weeks India scheduled a mid-December signing in Brussels of a free-trade agreement with the European Union spanning a market of more than two billion people [8], and its ambassador in New Delhi was telling Manila that India had become one of the first places the Philippines looks for weapons [9]. Every deal closed. None pointed in one direction. Europe named what it was doing. Washington cut 5,000 troops from Germany and halved its deep-strike aircraft and carriers in Europe to free resources for Asia [10], then by September was weighing a withdrawal of up to half of its 80,000 troops on the continent [11]. By July, European leaders had adopted "de-Americanization" as explicit strategy — pulling American technology out of government systems and building their own AI and space industries [12]. The International Institute for Strategic Studies put the resulting rearmament bill near a trillion dollars and named two drivers: Russia's military threat, and uncertainty over whether the United States would defend its European allies [13]. The same months, America's partners — the spokes of its Pacific alliance — began wiring each other directly. Japan made its first-ever transfer of finished defense equipment to the Philippines, coastal radar and drones, and its prime minister flew to Hanoi to deepen defense ties [14]. India ran a month of drills with Britain, with South Korea's navy for the first time, and with Indonesia [15]. The European Union signed its first comprehensive strategic partnership in Southeast Asia with Vietnam — semiconductors, critical minerals, maritime security — and its president said plainly what Europe was selling [16].
At a moment when the international rules-based order is under threat from multiple sides, we need to stand side by side as reliable and predictable partners. — António Costa
Australia wrote a $500 million check to Vanuatu to stay that island's primary security partner against China, its largest creditor [17]. None of this is a divorce. The Quad met in Manila last week with all four leaders and announced a joint maritime exercise for 2027 [18]. AUKUS moved from review to delivery in December [19]. The Marines are building a permanent weapons stockpile in Australia, deliberately beyond the reach of most Chinese missiles [20]. The pivot is real in hardware. What it is spending is something the hardware does not replace. The Lowy Institute finds America's military lead is now two-thirds what it was in 2017, eroded by Chinese long-range and area-denial systems — and that the United States still ranks first overall only because of its defense networks and alliances [21]. Elbridge Colby, the under secretary driving the pivot, calls that network a huge comparative advantage China does not have [17]. His own pivot's conduct is what is now pricing it. Trump is candid about the method and about what it is for.
I can tell you if it wasn't for tariffs and trade, I wouldn't have been able to make the deals. — Donald Trump
His stated aim is burden-sharing and the focus on China, not the dissolution of the alliances — and China's own courtship of the region is a force that matters here, too. But leaders across the alliance are saying, in the same moments the American move lands, what they concluded and what they began building. Seoul's curtailment of joint exercises in August, done without informing the government first, pushed support for an independent South Korean nuclear weapon to 65–70 percent and accelerated a nuclear submarine program [22]. The hardware even leaks: the THAAD batteries left for the Middle East, and the carrier Tripoli followed, thinning the very theater Washington had just renamed Pacific Command to hold [23][5]. The vacancy has an open bidder, and it advertises in the open. Europe's pitch to Hanoi was the product line; Modi's flight to Brussels in December to sign is the next moment to watch. Every American deal still closes — each one bilateral, each separately priced. The partners have simply stopped assuming the next one is coming.
- 1. South Korea Seeks Self-Reliance After US Relocates Air Defense Assets
- 2. Trump and Xi Extend Trade Truce During Washington Summit
- 3. Trump and Xi Reach Trade Deals Amid Taiwan Tensions
- 4. Donald Trump Calls Taiwan Arms Sales Negotiating Chip
- 5. Taiwan and Indo-Pacific Allies Pivot as Trump Shifts Focus
- 6. India Cancels Quad Summit Amid Donald Trump Mediation Claims
- 7. India and United States Finalize Historic Bilateral Trade Deal
- 8. India and EU Advance Trade Deal Ahead of Modi Visit
- 9. Philippines Ambassador Cites Indian Defense Ties as Deterrent Against China
- 10. US Accelerates Military Withdrawal From Europe to Pivot Toward Asia
- 11. United States Considers Withdrawing Half of European Troops
- 12. European Leaders Pursue De-Americanization Amid NATO Summit Tensions
- 13. European Nations Face Trillion-Dollar Rearmament Bill Amid U.S. Shift
- 14. Japan Provides $27 Million Defense Grant to Philippines
- 15. Indian Military Conducts Multi-Nation Naval and Air Exercises
- 16. EU and Vietnam Establish Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Hanoi
- 17. Australia and Vanuatu Reach $500 Million Nakamal Agreement
- 18. Trump and Quad Leaders Launch Superintelligence and Security Initiatives
- 19. AUKUS Partners Shift to Delivery After Trump Review
- 20. US Marine Corps Establishes Permanent Arms Stockpile in Australia
- 21. Lowy Institute Report Finds China Narrowing U.S. Military Gap
- 22. South Koreans Support Nuclear Arms After Trump Cuts Exercises
- 23. U.S.-Israel Conflict With Iran Disrupts Global Trade and Energy