Russia's Two-Sea Advantage

In late April, as Iranian gunships turned away commercial traffic from the Strait of Hormuz, a sanctioned Russian superyacht sailed through. The Nord, a $500 million vessel owned by oligarch Alexei Mordashov, transited the IRGC-controlled waterway without incident while 1,150 cargo vessels worth $125 billion sat stranded in the Persian Gulf ^[1][2]. Iran was charging passage fees of up to $2 million for the privilege — and Russian-linked ships were paying them.

Recent events have evidenced the depth and strength of our strategic partnership. — Abbas Araghci

Three months later and two thousand miles away, Russian missiles struck the Golden Leo, a Turkish-owned cargo ship carrying grain off Odesa, killing ten crew members including a Ukrainian pilot and Indian and Syrian sailors ^[3]. It was not an isolated attack. On June 22, Russian drones had targeted three civilian merchant vessels heading toward Odesa-region ports, killing an Egyptian crew member ^[4]. Russia is attacking grain shipping in one sea while its own vessels pass unmolested through another. The Strait of Hormuz normally carries roughly a third of the world's seaborne fertilizer trade. The blockade has severed that flow ^[5]. The World Bank forecasts a 30.7 percent increase in global fertilizer prices this year ^[6]. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization's chief economist, Maximo Torero, has warned of a severe food crisis within six to twelve months as farmers in South America, Asia, and Africa plant fewer crops or switch to commodities that require less fertilizer ^[7].

In the short term, essentially, the most important is to avoid export restrictions of energy and fertilizers. — Maximo Torero

The World Food Programme warns that 45 million people could be pushed into acute hunger — exceeding levels seen during the COVID-19 pandemic and the initial Ukraine war ^[5]. This is what makes the two blockades one crisis rather than two. The Black Sea attacks remove grain directly. The Hormuz closure removes the fertilizer that grows next season's grain. The same countries — in East Africa, South Asia, the Middle East — depend on both. The partnership predates the blockade. On February 17, Iran and Russia signed a strategic energy and military pact that included joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman and the northern Indian Ocean ^[8]. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev was unambiguous about what the pact meant.

We explicitly state that no one will be able to disrupt the strategic relations between Iran and Russia. — Sergei Tsivilev

Eleven days later, the Hormuz blockade began. When the UN Security Council moved to condemn it, Russia and China vetoed the resolution. Russian envoy Vasily Nebenzia offered a different explanation for the crisis ^[9].

The United States is acting like pirates and terrorists, targeting commercial vessels through coercion and intimidation, terrorizing their crews, unlawfully seizing ships and taking crew members hostage. — Amir-Saeid Iravani

A June 14 ceasefire briefly reopened Hormuz. Tanker traffic resumed on June 30 with a 54 percent weekly increase, and Brent crude dropped to roughly $73 a barrel ^[10]. But volume remained 70 percent below pre-war levels even at the recovery peak, and on July 9 Iran attacked three commercial vessels, collapsing the truce within weeks. A 15-nation naval coalition led by France and the United Kingdom has deployed to clear Iranian-laid mines and escort commercial ships, and the US Navy has guided nearly a thousand transits along an alternate route near Oman's coast ^[11][12]. But the coalition can escort vessels — it cannot lift the political blockade.

the strait would reopen “immediately” once Iran signs a memorandum of understanding to end hostilities. — Donald Trump

As long as Iran conditions the strait's reopening on a diplomatic resolution that has not materialized, the escorts are a bandage on a closed gate. Ukraine, for its part, has struck neutral merchant vessels in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. On June 5, Ukrainian drones hit five cargo ships heading to Rostov to load grain, killing four Azerbaijani crew members ^[13]. Over July 6 through 9, Ukraine systematically targeted up to 35 Russian vessels, including 19 shadow-fleet tankers, in the Sea of Azov and Taganrog Bay ^[14]. The maritime war runs both directions. But the asymmetry is not in who strikes whom — it is in who can still move. Ukraine gains no privileged transit through Hormuz. It has no partner blocking a second chokepoint. The strategic position is not symmetrical. Every mitigation attempt treats the two corridors separately: a Hormuz naval coalition here, a Black Sea grain initiative there. But Russia is the sole actor positioned at the intersection of both. The fertilizer supply chain ensures that pressure in one corridor becomes pressure in the other — a food-importing nation that loses grain shipments from Odesa this month will face fertilizer-driven crop failures next season. No existing mechanism addresses the two blockades as a single crisis, because no other country has a stake in both. Russian-linked vessels continue to pay Iran's passage fee and transit the strait that no one else can use. The Nord sailed through in April. They are still sailing through now.