The Ceasefire Israel Kept on Its Own Terms

In October 2025, Israel accepted the ceasefire Donald Trump brokered for Gaza. It approved the plan, pulled back from parts of Gaza City, released roughly 1,700 detainees, and let hundreds of aid trucks through each day ^[1]. Two months later the truce was already being called fragile: Israeli forces had killed more than 350 Palestinians and held more than half of Gaza, and one assessment noted that the region's stability depended heavily on US pressure to ensure Israeli compliance ^[2]. That pressure never arrived. What looked like a ceasefire eroding was a ceasefire kept only where it suited Israel and discarded everywhere else. The scoreboard since then runs one way. By February, Hamas and the Arab Parliament counted 1,450 violations and more than 500 dead ^[3]. By June the toll passed 1,000, and by August it stood above 1,260 killed since the truce began ^[4][5]. Over the same stretch, the share of Gaza under Israeli military control grew from 53 percent to 70 percent ^[6]. The ceasefire functioned as a floor for operations, not a ceiling. The officials running those operations are not improvising breaches; they are articulating a posture. Ben-Gvir described Israel in legislative terms as a sovereign nation not bound by external diplomatic understandings ^[7]. Defense Minister Katz was blunter about the ground itself, vowing Israel would not withdraw from its security zones in Lebanon, Syria, or Gaza under any circumstances ^[8]. Netanyahu supplied the governing principle.

Therefore, as far as we are concerned, what obligates us is the security of Israel, the security of our soldiers, and the security of our communities. — Benjamin Netanyahu

Compliance, in this framing, is whatever Israel's own security assessment says it is. The same logic governs the diplomatic channel. Israel rejected Trump's 15-point Gaza roadmap — which Hamas accepted — with Netanyahu's office stating flatly that Israel rejects the document ^[9]. It then rejected the 20-point disarmament plan, also accepted by Hamas, demanding the right to keep operating in Gaza and to exclude Qatar and Turkey from verification ^[10]. This week, when the Netherlands moved to ban West Bank settlement goods, Israel expelled two Dutch diplomats from the US-led Gaza support center and signaled British officials could be next ^[11]. Foreign Minister Sa'ar made the doctrine explicit: those who act against Israel will have no foothold in the region ^[11]. Here is the sharpest turn. Washington has the tool to push back, and it uses it on other partners. It suspended military aid to Ukraine in July 2025 for a capability review ^[12]. It paused arms deliveries to Estonia in April 2026 ^[13]. It has never suspended aid or weapons to Israel, through ten months of open defiance. Asked about Israel's refusal to withdraw, Vice President Vance was untroubled.

The United States wins either way. — JD Vance

Trump's own posture has swung from defending Israeli retaliation in October 2025 to saying this month that Israel should not be striking in Gaza ^[6][14] — rhetoric throughout, no tool behind it. Both men are managing the appearance of alignment. Netanyahu told ABC News that Israel and Washington were not diverging, that he had straightened things out with Vance ^[15] — even as his defense minister was declaring permanent zones. Trump, for his part, said he didn't need the assurances.

I don’t need Bibi to tell me that. Bibi is telling me that because he wants me to stay involved. — Donald Trump

Both know the gap between what is said and what is done; the gap is the arrangement. The endgame is concrete. In January, Netanyahu told Trump he intends to taper the $3.8 billion in annual US military aid to zero within a decade, redirecting $110 billion into domestic arms production ^[16]. The navy is spending $780 million on five missile ships and autonomous vessels built to secure trade routes without relying on allies ^[17]. What separates this from rhetoric is that Israel is putting money behind it. And Washington, by never deploying the enforcement tools it uses on others, is not slowing that exit. It is proceeding on Israel's timeline, not Washington's.